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A hearer's perception of an utterance as sarcastic depends on integration of the heard statement, the
discourse context, and the prosody of the utterance, as well as evaluation of the incongruity among these
aspects. The effect of prosody in sarcasm comprehension is evident in everyday conversation, but little is
known about its underlying mechanism or neural substrates. To elucidate the neural underpinnings of
sarcasm comprehension in the auditory modality, we conducted a functional MRI experiment with 21
adult participants. The participants were provided with a short vignette in which a child had done either
a good or bad deed, about which a parent made a positive comment. The participants were required to
judge the degree of the sarcasm in the parent's positive comment (praise), which was accompanied by
either positive or negative affective prosody. The behavioral data revealed that an incongruent combi-
nation of utterance and the context (i.e., the parent's positive comment on a bad deed by the child)
induced perception of sarcasm. There was a signiﬁcant interaction between context and prosody: sar-
casm perception was enhanced when positive prosody was used in the context of a bad deed or, vice
versa, when negative prosody was used in the context of a good deed. The corresponding interaction
effect was observed in the rostro-ventral portion of the left inferior frontal gyrus corresponding to
Brodmann's Area (BA) 47. Negative prosody incongruent with a positive utterance (praise) activated the
bilateral insula extending to the right inferior frontal gyrus, anterior cingulate cortex, and brainstem. Our
ﬁndings provide evidence that the left inferior frontal gyrus, particularly BA 47, is involved in integration
of discourse context and utterance with affective prosody in the comprehension of sarcasm.
& 2016 The Authors. Published by Elsevier Ltd. This is an open access article under the CC BY license
(http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0/).1. Introduction
Successful comprehension of sarcasm, which we deﬁne here as
a subcategory of verbal irony that communicates the speaker's31
r Ltd. This is an open access articl
hysiological Sciences (NIPS),
.negative or critical attitude, is often characterized by the hearer's
recognition of the gap between the semantic content of the ut-
terance and the speaker's communicative intent. Often, sarcastic
utterances are statements that are absurdly inadequate or bla-
tantly false in the light of reality or normative expectations. Con-
sider the following example from Wilson and Sperber (2012):
Sue (to someone who has done her a disservice): I can’t thank
you enough.e under the CC BY license (http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0/).
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Sue would wish to thank more extensively a person who has done
her a disservice. In fact, if the hearer fails to recognize the oddity of
what is described in the utterance, he is also likely to fail to ap-
preciate the speaker's critical attitude. The speaker of a sarcastic
utterance, who is aware of this possibility, often tries to provide
the hearer with rich but implicit clues regarding how the utter-
ance should be interpreted. For example, tone of voice, facial ex-
pressions, and gestures such as head shaking are often used by the
speaker as clues to indicate that the utterance should be inter-
preted as sarcastic (Bryant and Fox Tree, 2005). In this way, the
speaker of a sarcastic utterance implicitly highlights the contrast
between the semantic content of the utterance and what they
intend to communicate. According to Wilson and Sperber (2012),
by highlighting this contrast, the speaker intends to communicate
his dissociative attitude towards the thought expressed in the
sarcastic utterance itself. In other words, recognition of the gap
between different levels of meaning on the part of the hearer is a
crucial ﬁrst step in understanding the speaker's intentions.
1.1. Recognition of incongruity in sarcasm comprehension
Once the hearer has recognized the incongruity between what
he had expected to hear from the speaker, given a certain con-
versational context, and what he actually heard (i.e. what is de-
scribed in the utterance), the next phase of sarcasm comprehen-
sion, which is geared toward ﬁlling the gaps, begins. Pragmatic
models of irony comprehension, including sarcasm, are con-
structed on the basis of how the hearer's recognition of incon-
gruity during on-line comprehension will yield an ultimate un-
derstanding of the speaker's attitude and intentions (Gibbs, 1986;
Giora, 1997; Kreuz and Glucksberg, 1989; Kumon-Nakamura et al.,
1995; Utsumi, 2000).
Psychological studies on irony processing suggest that the in-
congruity involved in comprehension of sarcasm is multi-layered.
Classic or standard models of irony comprehension suggest that
detection of the incongruity between the discourse context (i.e.,
what happened and how the speaker felt about it in the real
world) and the statement enables the hearer to understand the
speaker's ironical intent (Ackerman, 1983; Colston, 2002; Katz and
Lee, 1993; Katz and Pexman, 1997; Kreuz and Glucksberg, 1989;
Ivanko and Pexman, 2003). Furthermore, the larger the disparity
between the statement and the discourse context, the more con-
demning is the irony perceived by the hearer (Colston and O’Brien,
2000; Gerrig and Goldvarg, 2000). Others have argued that the
salient difference in prosody between ironic and sincere state-
ments is often enough for a hearer to identify the utterance as an
instance of irony (Bryant and Fox Tree, 2005; Capelli et al., 1990).
In addition, a developmental study of irony comprehension de-
monstrated that children ﬁrst use ironic prosody as an effective
clue for irony comprehension around the age of 5 years, before
they can also make use of discourse context as a clue (Laval and
Bert-Erboul, 2005). Finally, a recent study revealed that there is an
interaction between discourse context and the speaker's tone of
voice in sarcasm comprehension. According to Woodland and
Voyer (2011), when the content of a target utterance was held
constant, the combination of the negative discourse context and
sarcastic tone of voice was judged most sarcastic, whereas the
combination of positive discourse context and sincere tone of
voice was least sarcastic, i.e., most sincere. On the other hand,
when the discourse context and prosody were incongruent (e.g.,
when negative discourse context and sincere tone of voice are
combined), the utterances were judged neither sarcastic nor sin-
cere, i.e., somewhere in the middle.
In this study, following classic accounts of sarcasm, we assume
that in everyday conversation, the hearer typically perceives anutterance as sarcastic when he recognizes the incongruity be-
tween what he expected to hear in the light of a particular context
and what he actually heard. This is probably because the hearer's
recognition of the incongruity makes him pay more attention to
the attitude of the speaker, which in turn enables him to attribute
a critical or sarcastic attitude to the speaker (Kumon-Nakamura
et al., 1995; Pexman, 2008). In addition, based on previous ﬁndings
(Colston, 2002; Colston and O’Brien, 2000; Gerrig and Goldvarg,
2000; Ivanko and Pexman, 2003), we assume that the degree of
incongruity between the discourse context and the statement will
inﬂuence the hearer's understanding of the speaker's attitude and
intentions.
1.2. Neural substrates for comprehension of sarcasm
Many theoretical and psychological studies of sarcasm,
including those reviewed above, suggest that the hearer's per-
ception of an utterance as being sarcastic often depends on his
success in recognizing the incongruity between what he expected
to hear and what he actually heard. The hearer's expectation of
what he should hear is heavily inﬂuenced by the available
discourse context and what he actually heard, which consists of
what was said (i.e., the semantic content of the utterance) as well
as how it was said (i.e., prosodic features accompanying the
utterance).
Following Ross (2000), we use the notion of affective prosody
to cover both emotional (e.g. happiness, sadness or anger) and
attitudinal (e.g. endorsement, criticism, or skepticism) prosody, as
distinct from the linguistic prosody of the utterance (e.g., sentence
focus, word stress, or as declarative or interrogative speech). Af-
fective prosody used in a sarcastic utterance has often been per-
ceived as a natural cue regarding the negative affect or critical or
contemptuous attitude that the speaker intends to communicate
(e.g. Shamay-Tsoory et al., 2005; Wilson and Sperber, 2012).
Affective prosody should be distinguished from “sarcastic pro-
sody” or a “sarcastic tone of voice,” although their acoustic char-
acteristics may partially overlap (Pell, 2006). Sarcastic prosody is a
natural acoustic cue to signal sarcastic intent in speech, even in the
absence of any semantic or contextual clues (e.g. Bryant and
Fox Tree, 2005; Cheang and Pell, 2008; Rockwell, 2007). On the
other hand, affective prosody, unlike sarcastic prosody, does not on
its own signal the sarcastic intent of the speaker. In this sense,
affective prosody has a more restricted role than sarcastic prosody
in comprehension of sarcasm. The main role of affective prosody is
to signal a speciﬁc attitude or emotion of the speaker that is
communicated by the utterance.
In a sarcastic utterance, however, the attitude communicated
by affective prosody is likely to be incongruent with the semantic
or/and contextual information of the utterance. In other words,
each of the three factors involved in sarcastic utterance, namely,
discourse context, semantic content, and accompanying affective
prosody, is likely to play an important but separate role in the
hearer's recognition of incongruity as it relates to sarcasm com-
prehension. We were interested in investigating how incongruity
among these three factors inﬂuences sarcasm perception, and in
elucidating the underlying neural mechanisms.
Previous studies of the neural substrates of sarcasm compre-
hension suggested that the medial prefrontal cortex (MPFC)
and the left inferior frontal gyrus (IFG) are centrally involved
(Uchiyama et al., 2006; Wang et al., 2006a; Spotorno et al., 2012).
The MPFC is considered to be the main neural basis for menta-
lizing (Spotorno et al., 2012), whereas the left IFG contributes to
integration of linguistic information (Uchiyama et al., 2006). More
generally, the left IFG is widely believed to play a crucial role in
processing semantic integration and evaluation (Dapretto and
Bookheimer, 1999; Gabrieli et al., 1996; Kapur et al., 1994; Rapp
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IFG, spanning from Brodmann's Area (BA) 47 to BA 44, is regarded
as a “uniﬁcation space” with a functional gradient, oriented in a
rostro-ventral to caudo-dorsal direction, that enables integration
of semantics, syntax, and phonology during sentence compre-
hension (Hagoort, 2005). Furthermore, probably through the
connection with the superior temporal gyrus (STG), the bilateral
IFG is involved in evaluation of affective tone of voice, which is
relevant for the executive processes such as controlling, over-
riding, or inhibiting behavioral and emotional responses (Frühholz
and Grandjean, 2013). Therefore, although the neural substrates of
the hearer's recognition of potential incongruity between what he
expected to hear and what he actually heard during comprehen-
sion of sarcasm have not been previously investigated, it seems
reasonable to hypothesize that the left IFG is also involved in in-
tegration and evaluation of semantic content, discourse context,
and affective prosody of sarcastic utterances, ultimately yielding
recognition of the incongruity among them.
Importantly, previous investigations of neural substrates of
sarcasm comprehension typically used only written sarcasm sti-
muli. As a result, the neural mechanisms that underlie processing
of the affective prosody accompanying a sarcastic utterance re-
main virtually unknown. Of the previous neuroimaging studies on
comprehension of sarcasm, only two included prosodic informa-
tion among the experimental stimuli (Wang et al., 2006a, 2006b).
Moreover, in those studies, a typical sarcastic or negative tone of
voice was always paired with negative discourse context (sar-
casm), and the typical sincere or positive tone of voice was always
paired with positive discourse context (sincere praise). In other
words, no attempt was made to separate the neural basis for
processing affective prosody from the neural activities involved in
processing of discourse context during sarcasm comprehension.
Thus, the neural basis for the detection of incongruity between
discourse context and the statement the hearer actually heard,
which consists not only of its semantic content but also of its af-
fective tone, has not been previously investigated.
To date, the neuro-psychological mechanism underlying pro-
cessing of a speaker's attitude conveyed via prosody (as in the case
of sarcasm in everyday conversation) has been investigated far less
extensively than the processing of a speaker's vocal emotion
(Mitchell and Ross, 2013). Existing neuro-cognitive models of af-
fective prosody comprehension focus solely on emotional prosody
(e.g. Frühholz and Grandjean, 2013; Schirmer and Kotz, 2006;
Wildgruber et al., 2006), and potential neuroanatomical differ-
ences between processing of emotional and attitudinal prosody
are yet to be explored. Given the paucity of studies on processing
of attitude conveyed by prosody in general, in the following we
will discuss neuro-psychological models of emotional prosody
processing and suggest how these models can be used as a starting
point for the ﬁrst study aimed at identifying the role of prosody in
sarcasm comprehension.
Previous neuroimaging studies demonstrated the involvement
of several neural areas other than auditory cortex in processing of
vocal emotion (Ethofer et al., 2012). For example, according to a
three-stage model suggested by Schirmer and Kotz (2006), the
ﬁrst sensory processing stage involves bilateral auditory proces-
sing areas, whereas the second integration stage engages the su-
perior temporal gyrus and the anterior superior temporal sulcus.
During the last stage of cognition stage in the model, explicit
evaluative judgments of affective prosody are mediated by the
right IFG and the orbitofrontal cortex, whereas the integration of
affective prosody into language processing recruits the IFG in the
left hemisphere. Based on other neuroimaging results, Wildgruber
et al. (2009) proposed a similar model in which the ﬁrst step,
bottom-up modulation or extraction of supra-segmental acoustic
information, is associated predominantly with activation of theright hemispheric primary and secondary acoustic regions in-
cluding the right mid superior temporal cortex, which is speciﬁ-
cally responsive to human voices (Belin et al., 2000). The second
step, representation of meaningful supra-segmental acoustic se-
quences, is linked to posterior aspects of the right superior tem-
poral sulcus (STS). The third step, emotional judgment, is linked to
the IFG. Connectivity analysis of cerebral activation revealed that
the right post-STS is the most likely input region into the network
of areas characterized by task-dependent activation (Ethofer et al.,
2006). Therefore, the right post-STS subserves the representation
of meaningful prosodic sequences and receives direct input from
primary and secondary acoustic regions. Because the right STS and
the bilateral IFG are activated by the explicit judgment of the
emotional valence conveyed by prosody (Ethofer et al., 2006), the
second and third steps are likely to represent the process depen-
dent on focusing of attention towards explicit emotional evalua-
tion (top-down effects). Both models indicate the task-dependent
involvement of the IFG during evaluation of affective prosody.
In addition, Frühholz and Grandjean (2013) suggested that the
bilateral IFG is involved in executive processes such as evaluation
and categorization of emotional prosody provided by higher-level
auditory regions in the STG. Although conﬁrming that the right IFG
is predominant in cognitively controlled evaluation of emotional
prosody, they argued against the existing view that involvement of
the left IFG is restricted to language-related features of emotional
prosody. They suggested instead that the left IFG plays more
generic roles in processing of emotional prosody, e.g. evaluation
and categorization. On the basis of these models, we suggest that
the left IFG is a likely candidate for the neural basis of integration
of affective prosody into language processing during sarcasm
comprehension.
Three previous studies investigated the neural basis of in-
tegration of affective prosody and linguistic information during
speech perception, although they did not focus on sarcasm
comprehension per se. Using functional magnetic resonance
imaging (fMRI), Schirmer et al. (2004) compared brain regions
that mediate processing of two types of emotional speech:
compatible (e.g., positive word with happy voice) or in-
compatible (e.g., positive word with angry voice) combinations of
emotional prosody and word meaning. The results revealed that
the left IFG was more strongly activated during the processing of
incompatible stimuli (e.g., the combination of positive word
meaning and angry prosody) than compatible stimuli. Similarly,
Mitchell (2006) compared functional brain responses to three
different types of utterances: (a) those with compatible semantic
content and emotional prosody; (b) those with incompatible
semantic content and emotional prosody; and (c) those with
emotional prosody and low-pass-ﬁltered semantic content (pro-
sody-only condition). The results suggested that the left IFG, bi-
lateral superior and middle temporal gyri, and basal ganglia are
associated with processing of utterances with incompatible
combinations of semantic content and emotional prosody. More
recently, Wittfoth et al. (2010) reported that the left IFG and the
middle temporal gyrus are engaged in processing of utterances
with happy prosody and negative semantic content. Collectively,
these studies demonstrated that the left IFG is centrally involved
in processing incompatible combinations of emotional prosody
and semantic content.
These ﬁndings indicate that the left IFG contributes not only to
integration of emotional prosody and semantic information of the
same utterance, but also to detection of valence compatibility
between them. Therefore, in this study, we addressed the novel
question of whether this function of the left IFG also extends to
integration of affective prosody and semantic content of the ut-
terance in sarcasm comprehension.
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of sarcasm
The hearer's perception of an utterance as being sarcastic often
depends on his detection of the incongruity between what is in-
dicated by the discourse context and the statement he actually
heard. In everyday conversation, the statement the hearer actually
heard consists not only of its semantic content, but also of a par-
ticular affective prosody accompanying it. Thus, before the hearer
recognizes the incongruity between the discourse context and the
statement, what is indicated by the particular affective prosody
needs to be integrated with semantic content. Therefore, the goal
of this study was to investigate, for the ﬁrst time, the neural
substrates of the integration of affective prosody with the meaning
of an utterance during the process leading to incongruity detection
in comprehension of sarcasm.
Adopting standard accounts of sarcasm comprehension (Ack-
erman, 1983; Colston, 2002; Katz and Pexman, 1997; Kreuz and
Glucksberg, 1989; Ivanko and Pexman, 2003), here we assume that
the semantic content of the utterance and the accompanying af-
fective prosody are considered as part of what the hearer actually
heard. In other words, both the semantic content and affective
prosody of the utterance together contribute to the hearer's per-
ception of what the speaker intended to communicate. Therefore,
when there is potential incongruity between what the hearer ex-
pected to hear on the basis of the context available and what he
actually heard, the degree of incongruity is evaluated solely be-
tween the overall meaning of the utterance and the discourse
context. That is, neither the semantic content of the utterance
alone, nor the accompanying affective prosody alone, is evaluated
during incongruity detection in sarcasm comprehension.
We also assume that evaluation of incongruity between the
statement and its discourse context consists of two stages. In the
ﬁrst stage, ‘integration by modulation,’ affective prosody is in-
tegrated into language processing during which it modulates the
positive or negative valence of semantic content. For example,
when positive prosody accompanies an utterance with positive
semantic content (compatible combination), the overall positive
valence of the utterance meaning is strengthened. By contrast, ne-
gative prosody accompanying an utterance with positive semantic
content would reduce the overall positive valence of the utterance
meaning. In the second stage, ‘evaluation,’ overall utterance
meaning (combination of semantic content and affective prosody),
which is the end product of the modulation stage, is evaluated for
its congruity or compatibility with the discourse context.
In order to examine the neural areas involved in incongruity
evaluation in sarcasm comprehension, we compared four experi-
mental conditions. Crucially, across conditions, the semantic con-
tent of the target utterance was kept positive. The remaining two
factors, namely, affective prosody and discourse context, were
categorized into simple binary opposites of either positive or ne-
gative in each condition. The resulting four conditions were as
follows: the combination of bad behavior (as the discourse con-
text) and negative prosody (BN); bad behavior and positive pro-
sody (BP); good behavior and positive prosody (GP); and good
behavior and negative prosody (GN).
Furthermore, on the basis of standard theories of sarcasm
comprehension, we predicted that the resulting degree of incon-
gruity between the discourse context and overall utterance
meaning would inﬂuence the likelihood that the target utterance
would be perceived as being sarcastic. For example, in the BP
condition the target utterance would be perceived as more sar-
castic than in the BN condition. By contrast, in the GP condition
the target utterance would be perceived as less sarcastic than in
the GN condition. We collected behavioral data to test these
predictions.On the basis of existing models of speech prosody (Ethofer
et al., 2006; Frühholz and Grandjean, 2013; Wildgruber et al.,
2009) and previous ﬁndings that the left IFG is centrally involved
in processing linguistic input whose semantic content is in-
compatible with accompanying affective prosody (Mitchell, 2006;
Schirmer et al., 2004; Wittfoth et al., 2010), we hypothesized that
the effect of prosody on sarcasm perception is expected in the left
IFG. Speciﬁcally, we predicted that activation of the left IFG would
be increased when the valence of affective prosody conﬂicts with a
discourse context that enhances sarcasm perception.2. Methods
2.1. Participants
Twenty-four participants were recruited as paid volunteers for
the fMRI experiment, but three participants were excluded due to
high rates of response errors in the judgment phase, leaving 21
participants for the ﬁnal analysis (13 females and 8 males; mean
age, 20.5 years; range, 19–27 years). All participants had normal or
corrected-to-normal visual acuity and were right-handed (mean
score: 87.7; range, 51.5–100) according to the Edinburgh handed-
ness inventory (Oldﬁeld, 1971); no history of neurological or psy-
chiatric illness was identiﬁed. Written informed consent to parti-
cipate in this study was obtained following procedures approved
by the Ethical Committee of the National Institute for Physiological
Sciences, Japan.
2.2. Preparation of task materials
In order to examine how affective prosody contributes to re-
cognition of incongruity between discourse context and utterance
meaning in sarcasm comprehension, we used a 22 factorial
design with discourse context (positive or negative) and affective
prosody (positive or negative) of the target utterance as in-
dependent variables and positive semantic content as a dependent
variable. Discourse context depicted either a good or bad deed of
the protagonist, and the target utterance was a positive comment
on that deed. We assumed that affective prosody plays a role in
modulating the semantic valence of the target utterance, i.e., when
the utterance was accompanied by positive prosody, its positive
valence would be strengthened; by contrast, when the target ut-
terance was accompanied by negative prosody, its positive valence
would be reduced.
As experimental stimuli, we used a set of daily conversations
between parent and child. Each stimulus consisted of four dis-
tinctive phases (Fig. 1), in which were presented: (1) the relevant
background situation; (2) the parent's utterance to the child;
(3) the child's reaction to the parent's utterance; and (4) the par-
ent's sarcastic or sincere comment about the child's reaction. The
ﬁrst three phases were demonstrated using illustrations (drawn by
a professional illustrator to reduce situational ambiguity) as well
as written texts. In the fourth phase, the parent's comments were
presented either aurally or via written text in an illustration. When
the comments were aurally presented, they were accompanied
with either negative or positive affective prosody (recorded by a
professional actor and actress). An example of mother–child con-
versation is given below:
(1) A boy was playing with lots of toys.
(2) His mother told him that he should tidy the toys before having his
snack.
(3) The boy started eating his snack before tidying the toys.
(4) His mother said, “You did a great job tidying the toys! ”
03.5
4
7.5
8
11.5
12
15.5
18
19
(1) background situation
A boy was playing with lots of toys.
(2) parent’s utterance
His mother told him 
that he should tidy the toys before having his snack
(3) child’s reaction
sarcastic condition (left)
The boy started eating his snack before tidying the toys.
literal condition (right)
The boy started eating his snack after tidying the toys.
(4) parent’s comment
with positive or negative affective prosody
(5) Judgment Phase
OR
+
+
+
+
(sec)
His mother said, “You did a great job tidying the toys!”
Fig. 1. Time course of an experimental trial: (1) the ﬁrst phase introduces the relevant background situation; (2) the second phase presents the parent's utterance to the
child; (3) the third phase shows the child's reaction to the parent's utterance; and (4) the fourth phase presents the parent's sarcastic or sincere comment about the child's
reaction. In the judgment phase (J), participants judged whether the speaker really meant what she/he said.
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mother's instruction given in the second phase. In this context, the
mother's comment in the fourth phase should be interpreted as an
example of sarcasm. By contrast, in the following example, in
which the child behaves as expected in the third phase, the same
comment given by the mother in the fourth phase should be in-
terpreted as a sincere praise.
(1) A boy was playing with lots of toys.
(2) His mother told him that he should tidy the toys before having his
snack.
(3) The boy started eating his snack after tidying the toys.
(4) His mother said, “You did a great job tidying the toys!”
In order to investigate the neural basis for processing affective
prosody sarcasm comprehension, we created four experimental
conditions, each of which is represented by an abbreviation asdeﬁned here: the BN condition (the child behaved badly in the
third phase [B] and the parent gave a comment on his behavior
with negative affective prosody in the fourth phase [N]); the BP
condition (the child behaved badly in the third phase [B] and the
parent gave a comment on his behavior with positive affective
prosody in the fourth phase [P]); the GN condition (the child's
behavior was good in the third phase [G] and the parent gave a
comment on his behavior with negative affective prosody in the
fourth phase [N]); and the GP condition (the child's behavior was
good in the third phase [G] and the parent gave a comment on his
behavior with positive affective prosody in the fourth phase [P]).
We included two ﬁller conditions, which are also represented
by abbreviation: the BW ﬁller condition (the child behaved badly
in the third phase, and the parent gave a comment expressed by a
written script in the fourth phase), and the GW ﬁller condition (the
child's behavior in the third phase was good and the parent gave a
comment expressed by a written script in the fourth phase). We
Table 1
Acoustical analyses for all conditions of affective prosody: duration mean, intensity mean, and F0 mean.
Conditions for affective prosody
N P A
Affective prosody N N P P Reversed
Semantic content Praise Praise Praise Praise Nonsense
Actor F M F M F and M
Duration (sec) 2.4 (0.19) 2.0 (0.29) 2.3 (0.15) 2.5 (0.22) 2.4 (0.19)
Intensity (dB) 73.6 (0.41) 69.8 (0.96) 75.0 (1.16) 68.7 (1.14) 69.5 (1.31)
F0 (Hz) 195.1 (7.6) 112.8 (3.2) 257.2 (8.4) 107.6 (3.0) 110.3 (4.5)
Abbreviations: N/P, parent's negative/positive affective prosody in the fourth phase; A, auditory baseline (nonsense sound created by reversing a parent's utterance) in the
fourth phase; F/M, female/male actors.
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control condition (A), in which reversed parents’ utterances and no
written letters were presented in the fourth phase, and a visual
control condition (V), in which randomized written letters and no
auditory input were presented. We prepared a total of 48 trials
(eight each for BN, BP, BW, GN, GP, and GW, and four trials each for
A and V) administered in four functional runs.
The parent's comments in the fourth phase were recorded by
one female and one male actor in a silent room using a micro-
phone (SM58; Shure, Evanston, IL, USA), an audio interface (0202;
E-MU Systems, Scotts Valley, CA, USA), and a personal computer
(ThinkPad X201; Lenovo, Morrisville, NC, USA). As shown in Ta-
ble 1, acoustical analyses for all conditions of affective prosody
were carried out using the PRAAT software version 5.4 (http://
www.praat.org/): mean duration (main effect of affective prosody:
F(1, 12)¼1.208, n.s.; main effect of female/male: F(1, 12)¼0.134, n.
s.; interaction between affective prosody and female/male: F(1,
12)¼2.081, n.s.), mean intensity (main effect of affective prosody: F
(1, 12)¼0.024, n.s.; main effect of female/male: F(1, 12)¼27.433,
po0.001; interaction between affective prosody and female/male:
F(1, 12)¼1.640, n.s.), and mean F0 (main effect of affective pro-
sody: F(1, 12)¼22.006, po0.001; main effect of female/male: F(1,
12)¼365.761, po0.001; interaction between affective prosody
and female/male: F(1, 12)¼30.683, po0.001). For recordings by
the female actor, positive affective prosodies were higher in fre-
quency than negative affective prosodies (simple main effect: F(1,
24)¼52.329, po0.001), whereas there was no signiﬁcant differ-
ence between positive and negative affective prosodies in re-
cordings by the male actor (simple main effect: F(1, 24)¼0.360, n.
s.).
To determine whether our experimental stimuli with these
auditory utterances were indeed perceived as sarcasm in the bad
context (BN and BP) conditions, 50 volunteers (26 females and 24
males; mean age, 21.2 years; range, 18–32 years) participated in a
norming study. We presented the experimental stimuli in a
pseudo-random order and asked the participants whether the
parent's comment in the fourth phase was an example of sarcasm,
sincere praise, or neither. The mean proportions of sarcasm
judgments were: 95.5% for the BN condition, 64.0% for the BP
condition, 29.8% for the GN condition, and 3.8% for the GP condi-
tion. A two-way ANOVA of discourse context (Bad, Good) and
emotional prosody (Positive, Negative) conducted on the angular-
transformed proportion of sarcasm judgments revealed that the
main effects of discourse context (F(1, 49)¼269.69, po0.001) and
emotional prosody (F(1, 49)¼81.31, po0.001) were signiﬁcant,
whereas the interaction between these two factors was not. These
results demonstrate that our experimental stimuli were well
controlled, in that praise for the bad deed (BN and BP conditions)
was interpreted as sarcasm, whereas praise for the good deed (GN
and GP conditions) was interpreted as sincere.2.3. fMRI procedures
Prior to the fMRI session, participants were given detailed in-
structions of the task procedure. In order to familiarize partici-
pants with the task, they were also provided with examples of
stimuli that did not appear during the fMRI session. All stimuli
were presented using the Presentation 14.8 software (Neurobe-
havioral Systems, Albany, CA, USA) running on a personal com-
puter (Dimension 9200; Dell Computer, Round Rock, TX, USA).
Using a liquid crystal display (LCD) projector (DLA-M200L; Victor,
Yokohama, Japan), the visual stimuli were projected onto a half-
transparent viewing screen located behind the head coil of the
magnetic resonance imaging (MRI) scanner. Participants viewed
the stimuli via a tilted mirror attached to the head coil. The spatial
resolution of the projector was 1024768 pixels, with a 60-Hz
refresh rate. The distance between the screen and the eyes of the
subjects was approximately 60 cm, and the visual angle was 18.9°
(horizontal)14.2° (vertical). Sentence stimuli (maximum visual
angle, 16.5°0.9°) were written in Japanese (the ﬁrst language of
the participants) and presented in black letters (visual angle,
18.9°14.2°). Auditory stimuli were presented via MR-compatible
headphones (Hitachi, Yokohama, Japan).
Each of the four phases of each trial was presented on the
screen for 3.5 seconds, followed by a ﬁxation cross on a black
screen (visual angle, 0.6°0.6°) for 0.5 s (Fig. 1). After the 4 pha-
ses, an additional ﬁxation cross was presented for 2 s, and then the
participant was required to judge whether what the parent said in
the fourth phase was what he/she really wanted to say (sincere
praise) or not (sarcasm), and to respond by pressing a button with
their right index or middle ﬁnger as quickly as possible while the
question mark “?” (visual angle, 0.6°0.6°) appeared on the screen
for 1 s. After the participant's response, a ﬁxation cross was shown
again on the screen for 6 s.
We used an event-related design to minimize habituation and
learning effects. The 48 task trials (8 scenarios 2 discourse
contexts  (2 affective prosodies þ1 no-prosody) and eight con-
trol trials were presented in a pseudo-random order. The experi-
ment consisted of four runs, each consisting of 12 experimental
trials (2 sets of [2 discourse contexts  (2 affective prosodies þ1
no-prosody)]), one auditory control trial and one visual control
trial. The presentation order of the four runs was counterbalanced
across participants.
All images were acquired using a 3-Tesla MR scanner (Allegra;
Siemens, Erlangen, Germany). An ascending T2*-weighted gra-
dient-echo echo-planar imaging (EPI) procedure was used in
functional imaging to produce 34 continuous transaxial slices
covering the entire cerebrum and cerebellum (time echo [TE],
30 ms; ﬂip angle, 85°; ﬁeld of view [FoV], 192 mm; 6464 matrix;
voxel dimensions, 3.03.0 mm in plan, 4.0 mm slice thickness
with 15% gap). A “sparse sampling” technique was used to mini-
mize the effects of image acquisition noise on task performance.
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same slice was 5000 ms. Cluster volume acquisition time was
2000 ms, leaving a 3000-ms silent period in which the sound
stimuli in the fourth phase were presented. Oblique scanning was
used to exclude the eyeballs from the images. Each run consisted
of a continuous series of 75 vol acquisitions, resulting a total
duration of 6 min 15 s For anatomical imaging, T1-weighted
magnetization-prepared rapid-acquisition gradient-echo (MP-
RAGE) images were also obtained (TR, 2500 ms; TE, 4.38 ms; ﬂip
angle, 8°; FoV, 230 mm; 1 slab; number of slices per slab, 192;
voxel dimensions, 0.90.91.0 mm) for each participant. The
total duration of the experiment was around 90 min for each
participant.
2.4. Data analysis
2.4.1. Behavioral performance
A two-way ANOVA with two within-subject factors, namely
discourse context and emotional prosody, was conducted on the
angular-transformed proportions of responses to the question of
whether what the parent said in the fourth phase was what he/she
really wanted to say (sincere praise) or not (sarcastic praise). The
analysis was carried out using SPSS version 22.0 software (IBM,
Armonk, NY, USA).
2.4.2. Imaging data
Preprocessing of the imaging data was performed as follows.
The ﬁrst two EPI volumes of each run were discarded due to un-
steady magnetization, and the remaining 73 EPI volumes per run
(a total of 292 EPI volumes per participant) were analyzed using
Statistical Parametric Mapping 8 (SPM8; Wellcome Department of
Imaging Neuroscience, London, UK; Friston et al., 2007) im-
plemented in MATLAB (Mathworks, Natick, MA, USA). EPI volumes
were spatially realigned to correct for head motion. Next, the T1
weighted anatomical image was co-registered to the mean image
of the EPI volumes, segmented into gray and white matter, re-
constructed (including a procedure for signal inhomogeneity cor-
rection), and spatially normalized to the Montréal Neurological
Institute T1 template. The normalization parameters of the T1
weighted anatomical image were applied to all the EPI volumes,
and then spatially smoothed in three dimensions using an 8 mm
full-width half-maximum Gaussian kernel.
After preprocessing, individual analysis of the EPI data obtained
for each participant was conducted using a general linear model.
The fourth phase of the four experimental conditions (BN, BP, GN,
GP), two ﬁller conditions (BW, GW) and two control conditions (A,
auditory control condition [reversed utterance in the fourth phase];
V, visual control condition [nonsense written letters and no audi-
tory input in the fourth phase]) were separately modeled by con-
volution with a hemodynamic response function. The ﬁrst, second,
and third phases were collapsed together and also modeled as a
regressor (C, context in the ﬁrst, second, and third phase, which was
modeled out) by convolution with a hemodynamic response func-
tion. Additionally, button responses were modeled as an in-
dependent regressor (J, judgment phase) using a convolved delta
function. High-pass ﬁlters (128 s) were applied to the time-series
data. An autoregressive model was used to estimate the temporal
autocorrelation. The signal of EPI images was scaled to a grand
mean of 100 overall voxels and volumes within each run. Six re-
gressors for head movement parameters obtained in the realign-
ment process were entered in the model. To depict the activations
evoked from the same control condition, we made the following
contrasts: BN versus A (auditory control condition) [BN–A], BP
versus A [BP–A], GN versus A [GN–A], and GP versus A [GP–A].
The contrast images, which consisted of the weighted sum of
parameter estimates and represented the normalized task-relatedincrement of the MR signal obtained in the individual analyses,
were subjected to group analysis with a random-effects model to
make population-level inferences regarding task-related activa-
tion. In total, data from 21 participants and four contrasts (BN–A,
BP–A, GN–A, and GP–A) were incorporated into the 2 (discourse
context)2 (affective prosody) within-subject factorial design
(Friston et al., 2007). Speciﬁcally, using the ﬂexible factorial design
model (Friston et al., 2007), a subject factor was set as in-
dependent to take different individuals into account. Error var-
iance was set as equal across participants because they were
sampled from the same underlying population. On the other hand,
two condition factors were set as dependent because the different
factor levels were correlated within subject, with equal error
variances because they were taken from the same subjects. To
show activations related to processing affective prosody in sar-
casm comprehension, we created the following contrasts: the in-
teraction contrast [–(BN–A)þ(BP–A)þ(GN–A) –(GP–A)] (i.e., [–BN
þBP þGN –GP]) and the main effect of affective prosody [þ(BN–
A) –(BP–A)þ(GN–A) –(GP–A)] (i.e., [þBN –BP þGN –GP]).
The resulting set of voxel values for each contrast constituted a
statistical parametric mapping (SPM) of the t statistic, which was
transformed into normal distribution units with a threshold set at
Z43.09 (po0.001) at the voxel level and po0.05 with a correc-
tion for multiple comparisons at the cluster level for the entire
brain.
To conﬁrm the involvement of the IFG regarding the main ef-
fect of affective (negative) prosody, we evaluated the overlap be-
tween the activation clusters and the pre-deﬁned ROIs (bilateral
BA 44 and BA 45) provided by SPM Anatomy Toolbox version 2.1
(Eickhoff et al., 2007), using MarsBaR version .44 (http://marsbar.
sourceforge.net).3. Results
3.1. Behavioral performance
As expected, when emotional prosody and semantic content
were incongruous (negative prosody), in contrast to congruous
positive prosody, the percentage of insincerity judgments de-
creased when the discourse context and the semantic content
were incongruous (praise for bad deed), whereas it increased
when they were congruous (praise for good deed) (Fig. 2). The
proportions of sarcastic responses were 79.8% for the BN condi-
tion, 97.6% for the BP condition, 40.5% for the GN condition, and
1.2% for the GP condition (Fig. 2). A two-way ANOVA of discourse
context (Bad, Good) and prosody (Positive, Negative) revealed a
signiﬁcant main effect of discourse context, F(1, 20)¼127.11,
po0.001, and a signiﬁcant main effect of prosody, F(1, 20)¼12.03,
po0.01. There was a signiﬁcant interaction between these two
factors, F(1, 20)¼19.50, po0.001. The nature of this interaction
was such that when a discourse context involved a bad event, an
utterance accompanied by positive prosody was judged as sig-
niﬁcantly more sarcastic than an utterance with negative prosody,
F(1, 40)¼7.17, po0.05. By contrast, for a discourse context invol-
ving a good event, an utterance with positive prosody was judged
as signiﬁcantly less sarcastic than one with negative prosody,
F(1, 40)¼29.47, po0.001. This result indicates that positive pro-
sody facilitates sarcastic interpretation of an utterance with posi-
tive semantic valence in a bad context, possibly by enhancing the
overall positive valence of the utterance and thereby increasing
the degree of incongruity between utterance meaning and dis-
course context. On the other hand, it inhibits sarcastic inter-
pretation when an utterance with positive semantic valence is
used in a positive context, because the enhancement of the posi-
tive valence of the utterance eliminates the incongruity between
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Fig. 2. The percentage of answers indicating that what the parent said in the fourth
phase was not what he/she really meant (sarcastic interpretation) were as follows:
79.8% for the BN condition, 97.6% for the BP condition, 40.5% for the GN condition,
and 1.2% for the GP condition. When the child exhibited bad behavior in the third
phase (B), the degree of incongruity in the BP condition was higher than in the BN
condition. When the child exhibited good behavior in the third phase (G), the
degree of incongruity in the GN condition was higher than in the GP condition.
Abbreviations: B/G, child's bad/good behavior in the third phase; N/P, parent's
negative/positive prosody in the fourth phase.
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3.2. Group analysis of fMRI data
We observed corresponding interaction effects in utterance-
related neural activation in the left IFG (BA 47; the Montréal
Neurological Institute [MNI] coordinates [38 34 8]; Fig. 3
(a) and Table 2a). A main effect of negative prosody was found in
the bilateral anterior insula (AI; BA 13; [30 18 8]; [32 22 12]),
the posterior rostral zone of anterior cingulate cortex (ACC; BA 32/
8; [2 28 40]), and the brainstem ([0 22 24]) (Fig. 3(b) and
Table 2b). In the activated cluster (877 voxels) including the left AI,
2.1% (18 voxels) were in left BA 44, and 0.5% (4 voxels) were in left
BA 45. In the mass (2482 voxels) including the right AI, 4.8% (118
voxels) were in right BA 44, and 15.2% (377 voxels) were in right
BA 45.4. Discussion
Let us summarize the main ﬁndings of the current study. First,
analysis of the behavioral data conﬁrmed our predictions con-
cerning perception of sarcasm and interaction of affective prosody
and discourse context. When positive prosody was combined with
positive semantic content, it enhanced the overall positive valence
of utterance meaning. On the other hand, when negative prosody
was combined with positive semantic content, the overall positive
valence of utterance meaning was reduced. As a result, greater
incongruity was perceived in the BP condition than in the BN
condition. Consequently, utterances in the BP condition were
judged as more sarcastic than those in the BN condition. On the
other hand, negative prosody used in a positive discourse context,
when combined with positive semantic content as in the GN
condition, reduced the positive valence of utterance meaning and
thus created incongruity between the utterance meaning anddiscourse context. As a result, utterances in the GN condition were
perceived as more sarcastic than those in the GP condition.
Regarding the neural correlates, the left rostro-ventral IFG (BA
47) exhibited a signiﬁcant interaction effect, indicating that in-
congruent prosody enhances the neural response of the left IFG to
the context-dependent perception of the utterance. Thus, the left
rostro-ventral IFG may neurally represent the integration of the
statement, context, and prosody. On the other hand, the right IFG,
including both rostral and caudal portions, was activated by ne-
gative prosody. Importantly, in this study, the uttered words were
always “praise,” which is semantically positive, whereas the af-
fective prosody was negative or positive. In other words, the main
effect of negative prosody observed in this study may represent
incongruity detection between the statement (praise) and nega-
tive prosody. Therefore, there is a functional asymmetry in terms
of incongruity processing by the right (statement-prosody) and
the left (statement-prosody-context) IFG.
Previous fMRI studies of comprehension of ﬁgurative language
and sarcasm reported that the left IFG is activated during com-
prehension (Rapp et al., 2004, 2010; Spotorno et al., 2012;
Uchiyama et al., 2006; Zempleni et al., 2007). Some of these stu-
dies suggested that the main function of the left IFG is to integrate
semantic information with higher-order mindreading. Other stu-
dies claimed that the left IFG is involved in the process of selecting
semantic information from a set of competing alternatives (Gab-
rieli et al., 1996; Petrides, 2005; Sakai, 2005; Thompson-Schill,
2003; Thompson-Schill et al., 1997; Thompson-Schill et al., 1999;
Turken and Dronkers, 2011). The contribution of the left IFG,
however, may not be tied to semantic processes, but instead may
also apply to the selection process in other non-linguistic domains
of cognition (Banich et al., 2001; Leung et al., 2000; Mead et al.,
2002; Milham et al., 2001; Peterson et al., 2002; Zysset et al.,
2001). It has also been suggested that the left IFG plays a key role
in integrating world knowledge and sentence contexts (Hagoort
et al., 2004; Menenti et al., 2009; Rapp et al., 2011). In light of
these ﬁndings, it seems likely that the left IFG is involved in both
selection and integration of a set of competing information in
order to yield an interpretation of what is going on. The results of
this study sheds further light on the potential function of the left
IFG by demonstrating that this region, particularly BA 47, is also
involved in the comprehension of sarcasm. It carries an important
function of identifying compatibility among perceived informa-
tion, integrating different aspects of utterance meaning via mod-
ulation on the basis of the identiﬁed incompatibility, and evalu-
ating congruity between relevant world knowledge (discourse
context) and overall utterance meaning, which assists in percep-
tion of sarcasm.
We also observed an effect of statement-prosody incongruity in
the ACC and the anterior insula adjacent to the inferior frontal
gyrus. It has been suggested that the anterior insula, the right
fronto-insular cortex, and the anterior cingulate cortex form a
“salience network” that marks salient events and initiates appro-
priate control signals for additional processing (Menon and Uddin,
2010; Sridharan et al., 2008). In this context, it is conceivable that
the salience network, incorporated with the right IFG, is involved
in detection of statement-prosodic incongruity that in turn in-
itiates further processing of incorporating context mediated by the
rostral IFG (BA 47).
We wish to note that this study had some limitations. For ex-
ample, in order to keep the total duration of the fMRI experiment
within a reasonable interval, we restricted our target utterances to
those with positive semantic valence. Future research should in-
vestigate whether the neural mechanism underlying recognition
of incongruity in sarcasm comprehension identiﬁed in this study
also applies to statements with negative semantic valence.
Furthermore, several potentially interesting questions
Fig. 3. Activations related to affective prosody in sarcasm comprehension. Each graph was drawn setting the auditory baseline as zero. (a) The left inferior frontal gyrus (IFG;
BA 47; MNI coordinates [38 34 8]) was activated by the interactional contrast of [–BN þBP þGN –GP]. (b) The bilateral anterior insula (AI; BA 13; [30 18 8]; [32 22
12]) extending to the right inferior frontal gyrus (IFG, BA 44, 45, 47) (see Table 2), the anterior cingulate cortex (ACC; BA 32/8; [2 28 40]), and the brainstem ([0 22 24])
were activated by the main effect of [þBN –BP þGN –GP]. Abbreviations: B/G, child's bad/good attitude in the third phase; N/P, parent's negative/positive affective prosody in
the fourth phase; A, auditory baseline (nonsense sound created by reversing a parent's utterance) in the fourth phase; MNI, Montréal Neurological Institute; BA, Brodmann's
area.
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Table 2
Activations related to affective prosody in sarcasm comprehension.
Cluster p-FWE Cluster size Z-value MNI coordinates Side Location BA
x y z
(a) Effect of Incongruity Change: contrast of [BN þBP þGN GP]
0.012 314 4.31 38 34 8 L IFG 47
(b) Effect of Prosodic Modulation: contrast of [þBN BP þGN GP]
0.000 2689 6.63 2 28 40 R ACC 32/8
0.000 2482 6.20 32 22 12 R AI 13
5.31 52 18 10 R IFG 44
5.27 48 22 4 R IFG 45
4.46 50 38 10 R IFG 47
0.000 877 5.50 30 18 8 L AI 13
0.001 497 5.03 0 22 24 Brainstem
Abbreviations: IFG, inferior frontal gyrus; ACC, anterior cingulate cortex; AI, anterior insula; MNI, the Montréal Neurological Institute; BA, Brodmann's area; L, left; R, right.
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excluded from the current study. For instance, while the current
study was designed to investigate mechanisms of incongruity
detection in situations where the affective prosody has a predicted
role in modulating the semantic content of an utterance, there are
potentially many other ways for the hearer to perceive an utter-
ance as sarcastic. More speciﬁcally, previous studies suggested that
recognition of incongruity between discourse context and emo-
tional prosody (e.g., the combination of negative discourse context
and positive emotional prosody) alone (e.g. Woodland and Voyer,
2011), or between the discourse context and semantic content of
the utterance alone (e.g. a combination of positive discourse
context and negative semantic content) (Colston, 2002), or even
detection of incompatibility between the semantic content of the
utterance and the emotional tone of voice alone (without context)
(e.g. Bryant and Fox Tree, 2005), may be sufﬁcient to allow the
hearer to perceive an utterance as being sarcastic. In future re-
search, the experimental paradigm used in this study would be
effective not only in comparing and contrasting alternative me-
chanisms for detection of all potential sources of incongruity in
sarcasm comprehension, but also for testing existing hypotheses
about the function of the left IFG in utterance comprehension in
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